It came to pass that in 1789, with a brand new president, a decisively split political consensus on the part of the new Congress, attempts were made to resolve the issues existing with the Barbary States. However, with so much political controversy on how best to negotiate with the Musselmen countries, it wasn't until a year later, nearing the time England and France entered into the Napoleonic Wars, that an American Congressional resolution was finally reached—pay the tribute. In the meantime, the Barbary States, with a concentration on Algiers, continued to harass the American merchant vessels with a seeming and never-ending gusto.

The political structure of the United States of America had been established. George Washington was the newly elected President of the United States of America. John Adams was his Vice-President and Thomas Jefferson was his Secretary of State.

Of these three, it was the Secretary of State who shouldered the responsibility to report to the Congress on the state of American commerce. Kind of a mini State of the Union on foreign commerce.

Jefferson understood that negotiations with the Barbary States and the status of United States commerce in the Mediterranean were intimately connected. Currently there was no carrying trade in the Mediterranean due to the Barbary States piratical activity. After all, the bulk of Mediterranean commerce passed within sight of a North African state.

Possessing no proof, he drew up short of outright accusing England of influencing and indeed supporting the Barbary States' hostilities against America. But he continued to adamantly condemn Barbary State hostility as the reason for the lack of Mediterranean commerce.

A hostility he classified to be extortion through piracy whether directed against the United States of America or any other country. Jefferson even more adamantly opposed succumbing to extortion and paying a so-called tribute for peace.

In the past, the Washington administration had initially, albeit reluctantly and without Jefferson's concurrence, made several attempts to pay the tributes demanded by the Barbary States. But the Musselmen would go back on their word so often, it quickly became obvious to the administration that the paying of tribute was not a long term solution. In some cases, it was not even a short term solution. So Washington was very surprised when Congress felt that resolution to the situation was to pay the tribute.

Even in the light of the various heads of the Barbary States, for whatever reason they could conjure up, disavowing any tribute paid by the USA and continuing hostilities with never a lull in activity, let alone a truce, Congress maintained that paying tribute was the answer. Washington was befuddled.

Washington's own Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson very vocally made it known to Congress that he disagreed with this so-called solution. He felt peace was the natural order of things and fair for all. "Peace is to be expected," claimed Jefferson, "it is not something to be purchased for a price."

He was also concerned that his claim of any unsubstantiated accusation toward England would result in a Congressional perception that he was trying to find excuses for the Mediterranean commerce being out of reach. Rather that any unsubstantiated accusation was really the lack of the Washington administration's ability, his ability, to negotiate. Both he and Adams feared some would begin to openly suggest that America should consider a re-alliance with England in order to regain the English "naval protection" it once enjoyed.

Jefferson knew that were he to admit that the Barbary States could not be controlled by America, he would be admitting a Washington administration failure. More importantly, he would be admitting his own personal failure to negotiate with a foreign power. And as politically ambitious as he was, any negative admission to Congress was something he simply could not allow himself to do.

At the insistence of President Washington and the concurrence of Vice-President Adams, Jefferson reluctantly reported to Congress that the Washington administration would pay tribute to the Barbary States, just as Congress had decreed. But in doing so, he also threw out a caveat; he told congressional leaders that the likelihood of the Barbary States, especially Algiers, to adhere to any tribute for any significant length of time, regardless of the amount paid, was very dismal.

Despite Jefferson's Olympic attempts to deter blame for the lack of Mediterranean commerce from the Washington administration and himself, in the eyes of congress the Washington administration was appearing incompetent. Reluctantly, both Adams and Jefferson relayed to President Washington that the current congressional feeling toward the lack of Mediterranean commerce was apt to lead the United States of America down a road of pure turmoil—tribute or no tribute. There may even be calls for reunification with England.

To justify their position they further maintained that there existed a political undercurrent in Congress that reasoned; unless some sort of re-unification with England was considered in order to regain naval protection in the Mediterranean, American commercial potential could never be achieved.

They also relayed that Congress was strangely insistent that commerce, particularly Mediterranean commerce, be successful. Commerce with other areas of the world, like the West Indies and China notwithstanding, the Mediterranean seemed first and foremost on the political mind of Congress, leading one to wonder what other influences from what other countries may be at work in American politics. All this they made known to President Washington's ears only.

The intelligence Washington received from Adams and Jefferson grabbed his attention like never before. It led him to ask himself if his own administration was just being paranoid with a "covert conspiracy" theory or did such an undercurrent truly exist with Congress. Surely no one in their right mind would actually desire the Untied States of America to once again fall under English rule.

But the more President Washington thought about the extraordinary focus of Congress on Mediterranean commerce, especially when commerce in other parts of the world was quite good, the more he came to believe that there very well may be a politically covert conspiratorial effort. The practically continuous claims of conspiracy from his own folks, both Adams and Jefferson, didn't do anything to dissuade his conspiracy thoughts either.

Whether the President's belief was the result of a fear of failure or pressure from being President of the United States of America or even Adams' and Jefferson's constant drum beating, he concluded that a plan of action must be decided upon quickly. A plan that would result in a firm resolution that would allow for viable, long term Mediterranean commerce and put to rest the congressional murmurs of re-unification with England, if in fact there were any.

If there truly was a conspiracy in Congress, any plan to re-establish Mediterranean commerce would necessarily have to be kept very secret and held closely within his administration or it would be thwarted at the very start by factions that desired re-unification. If the plan were to be a military type action, secrecy was absolutely imperative, not only secrecy from Congress but also from the general public. Especially since...