Legacy of the Great War: Germany and the Causes of the First World War

Mark Hewitson

ISBN 10: 1859738702 / ISBN 13: 9781859738702

Verlag: Berg Publishers, 2004

Beschreibung

Leichte Kratzer / Abnutzungen / Druckstellen. How can we understand the causes of World War I and Germany's role in it? This book prompts a re-evaluation of the events leading to the global conflict in 1914. Recent historical interpretations suggest that German leaders acted defensively in response to a deteriorating military and diplomatic situation. However, this work challenges that view, emphasizing that the German Chancellor, Foreign Office, and Great General Staff believed in their ability to win a continental war. This confidence stemmed from an assumption of French decline and Russian weakness prior to the war. Consequently, German policymakers pursued aggressive strategies, risking conflict during critical moments in the early 20th century. The author examines how enemy states were stereotyped, the portrayal of war during peacetime, and the evolving perceptions of international relations. He highlights the influence of ruling elites, political parties, big business, and the press, arguing that significant shifts in German foreign policy occurred in the decade leading up to the war. By the July crisis of 1914, perceptions had shifted, with Russia emerging as the primary adversary. Under these new circumstances, German leaders could adopt a strategy of brinkmanship, using war as a policy tool to its fullest extent.

Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers c14edde2-95ab-49ea-83f1-104846e2a4df

Bibliografische Details

• Titel: Legacy of the Great War: Germany and the Causes of the First World War
• Verlag: Berg Publishers
• Erscheinungsjahr: 2004
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN-10: 1859738702
• ISBN-13: 9781859738702
• Einband: Softcover
• Zustand: As New
• Verkäuferkataloge:
  • Military History

Über diesen Titel

Inhaltsangabe

How can we understand what caused World War I? What role did Germany play? This book encourages us to re-think the events that led to global conflict in 1914.Historians in recent years have argued that German leaders acted defensively or pre-emptively in 1914, conscious of the Reich's deteriorating military and diplomatic position. Germany and the Causes of the First World War challenges such interpretations, placing new emphasis on the idea that the Reich Chancellor, the German Foreign Office and the Great General Staff were confident that they could win a continental war. This belief in Germany's superiority derived primarily from an assumption of French decline and Russian weakness throughout the period between the turn of the century and the eve of the First World War. Accordingly, Wilhelmine policy-makers pursued offensive policies - at the risk of war at important junctures during the 1900s and 1910s. The author analyses the stereotyping of enemy states, representations of war in peacetime, and conceptualizations of international relations. He uncovers the complex role of ruling elites, political parties, big business and the press, and contends that the decade before the First World War witnessed some critical changes in German foreign policy. By the time of the July crisis of 1914, for example, the perception of enemies had altered, with Russia - the traditional bugbear of the German centre and left - becoming the principal opponent of the Reich. Under these changed conditions, German leaders could now pursue their strategy of brinkmanship, using war as an instrument of policy, to its logical conclusion.

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Mark Hewitson is Lecturer in German Politics and History at the University College London, UK.