G. E. Moore's Intuitionism. A highly implausible meta-ethical position

Mark Costello

ISBN 10: 3668447403 / ISBN 13: 9783668447400

Verlag: GRIN Verlag

Beschreibung

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Essay from the year 2016 in the subject Philosophy - Miscellaneous, grade: 71, Trinity College Dublin (The Department of Philosophy), course: TSM Philosophy, language: English, abstract: This paper will aim to outline G. E. Moore's defence in 'Principia Ethica' of the view that goodness and consequently moral truth is indefinable. This paper will firstly outline a picture of the autonomous indefinable nature of goodness through Moore's open-question argument and naturalistic fallacy and will then proceed to critique this characterisation by highlighting the subsequent problematic consequences that accompany the proposed indefinability. The paper will then detail Moore's ensuing intuitive meta-ethical theory after which I will argue that the meta-ethical picture that Moore constructs is entirely implausible due to the proposed self-evident nature of moral truths and the vague faculty of intuition that it implies.

Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9783668447400

Bibliografische Details

• Titel: G. E. Moore's Intuitionism. A highly implausible meta-ethical position
• Verlag: GRIN Verlag
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN-10: 3668447403
• ISBN-13: 9783668447400
• Einband: Taschenbuch
• Zustand: Neu

Über diesen Titel

Inhaltsangabe

Essay from the year 2016 in the subject Philosophy - Miscellaneous, grade: 71, Trinity College Dublin (The Department of Philosophy), course: TSM Philosophy, language: English, abstract: This paper will aim to outline G. E. Moore's defence in "Principia Ethica" of the view that goodness and consequently moral truth is indefinable. This paper will firstly outline a picture of the autonomous indefinable nature of goodness through Moore's open-question argument and naturalistic fallacy and will then proceed to critique this characterisation by highlighting the subsequent problematic consequences that accompany the proposed indefinability. The paper will then detail Moore's ensuing intuitive meta-ethical theory after which I will argue that the meta-ethical picture that Moore constructs is entirely implausible due to the proposed self-evident nature of moral truths and the vague faculty of intuition that it implies.