The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003

Inwagen, Peter van; ;

ISBN 10: 0199245606 / ISBN 13: 9780199245604

Verlag: Oxford University Press, Oxford, England / New York, New York, 2006

Beschreibung

Clarendon Press. xiv, 183 pp. LCC: 2006006153 Good condition; occasional underlining and notations in pencil.

Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 1009I0982

Bibliografische Details

• Titel: The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003
• Verlag: Oxford University Press, Oxford, England / New York, New York
• Erscheinungsjahr: 2006
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN-10: 0199245606
• ISBN-13: 9780199245604
• Einband: Hardcover
• Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Very good
• Verkäuferkataloge:
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Über diesen Titel

Inhaltsangabe

It is generally supposed that the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering, much of it truly horrible suffering, confronts those who believe in an all-powerful and benevolent Creator with a serious problem: to explain why such a Creator would permit this. Many reflective people are convinced that the problem, the problem of evil, is insoluble. The reasons that underlie this conviction can be formulated as a powerful argument for the non-existence of God, the so-called argument from evil: If there were a God, he would not permit the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible suffering; since such suffering exists, there is no God. Peter van Inwagen examines this argument, which he regards as a paradigmatically philosophical argument. His conclusion is that (like most philosophical arguments) it is a failure. He seeks to demonstrate, not that God exists, but the fact that the world contains a vast amount of suffering does not show that God does not exist.

Along the way he discusses a wide range of topics of interest to philosophers and theologians, such as: the concept of God; what might be meant by describing a philosophical argument as a failure; the distinction between versions of the argument from evil that depend on the vast amount of evil in the world and versions of the argument that depend on a particular evil, such as the Lisbon earthquake or the death of a fawn in a forest fire; the free-will defense; animal suffering; and the problem of the hiddenness of God.

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Peter van Inwagen is John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.