Brand New, Unread Copy in Perfect Condition. A+ Customer Service! Summary: In recent decades, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain'along with most industrial countries'witnessed a sharp rise in the size of government and a large accumulation of public debt. While the latter trend began to reverse under the constraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, public expenditure and debt remain high by international standards. These are well-recognized sources of concern to policymakers, especially as the rapid aging of the population increases spending on pensions and health care while reducing the labor force and therefore economic growth and the tax base. In practice, reducing public spending and government debt is politically difficult because the process inevitably leaves some groups worse off.1 To overcome these difficulties, an increasing number of countries have adopted formal fiscal rules, such as balanced-budget rules or multiyear frameworks that limit discretionary fiscal policy.2 The proponents of rules argue that the commitment to a medium-term plan for public finances makes it easier for fiscal authorities to withstand pressures for higher spending and delayed fiscal adjustment. Critics highlight that rules may constrain the ability of governments to run countercyclical fiscal policy and express skepticism on the effectiveness of rules, because of the scope left for creative accounting. This paper studies the design of fiscal rules and frameworks, with particular reference to France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. In different ways, these countries face substantial public finance challenges over the next decade: high levels of outstanding public debt (Italy in particular), the consequences of a rapidly aging population for future social spending, and the need to ensure adequate scope for reduction of the still-high tax burden while maintaining an adequate level of public sector capital spending. Buchnummer des Verkäufers
Inhaltsangabe: Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit by more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.
Buchbeschreibung Intl Monetary Fund. Paperback. Buchzustand: VERY GOOD. little to no wear, pages are clean. The cover and binding are crisp with next no creases. Buchnummer des Verkäufers 2752409255
Buchbeschreibung International Monetary Fund, 2003. Paperback. Buchzustand: NEW. 9781589062160 This listing is a new book, a title currently in-print which we order directly and immediately from the publisher. Buchnummer des Verkäufers HTANDREE0797994
Buchbeschreibung International Monetary Fund (IMF), United States, 2003. Paperback. Buchzustand: New. 274 x 211 mm. Language: English . This book usually ship within 10-15 business days and we will endeavor to dispatch orders quicker than this where possible. Brand New Book. In recent decades, most industrial countries have seen a sharp rise in the size of government and a large accumulation of public debt. An increasing number of countries have adopted formal fiscal rules to deal with high public debt levels, such as balanced-budget rules or multiyear frameworks that limit discretionary fiscal policy. This paper studies the design of fiscal rules and frameworks, focusing on the experiences in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Buchnummer des Verkäufers TNP9781589062160
Buchbeschreibung Intl Monetary Fund, 2003. Paperback. Buchzustand: New. illustrated edition. Buchnummer des Verkäufers DADAX1589062167