Rules For Rulers. Dieser Artikel ist nicht verfügbar.
Sprache: Englisch
Verlag: Temple University Press, 1990
- Hardcover
- Gebraucht

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Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers OTV.0877226857.G
- Titel
- Rules For Rulers
- Autor
- Meltsner, Arnold
- Verlag
- Temple University Press
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 1990
- Zustand
- good
- Einband
- Hardcover
- Sprache
- Englisch
- ISBN-10
- 0877226857
- ISBN-13
- 9780877226857
In this witty and contemporaneous essay, Arnold J. Meltsner, as a modern-day Machiavelli, offers advice to government and corporate leaders on the human pitfalls of seeking, evaluating, and using advice. Drawing examples mainly from the Oval Office and recent history, he examines the factors that affect decision making and proposes rules to help rulers maintain vigilance over their advisers and remain sensitive to the politics of personal influence and persuasion. Meltsner sees the advisory situation as dramatic, so he uses the metaphor of a play with four key scenes to describe the psychological and social context. Presenting numerous situations that arise during these scenes, Meltsner extrapolates about a half-dozen rules from each scene in this play. Specific, practical advice shapes his commentary: for example, 'Keep the inner circle small ...Be careful about revealing your own preferences ...Recognize partial views including your own ...Avoid public protest resignations'.In addition to the ruler-adviser relationship, the author discusses secrecy and leaks, the structure within which rulers make decisions, and the various ways of calibrating advice. Using sometimes humorous and sometimes painful examples, Meltsner demonstrates that rulers' reactions to advice are often based on such factors as expertise, trust, prior performance, predilections, and consensus. 'Rulers should temper their notion of the loyal adviser as an extension of themselves and not assume that they and their advisers are one'. Local and national leaders, military generals, industrial managers, and CEOs rulers of all kinds can surely benefit from this advice. Author note: Arnold J. Meltsner is Professor of Public Policy Emeritus at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley.
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