Science in Flux. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ; 28

1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux.- References.- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper.- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable.- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation.- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is.- IV. Popper's Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates.- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions.- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End.- References.- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper's Philosophy.- Notes.- 3. On Novelty.- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General.- II. Science and Truth.- III. Popper's View of Science.- Notes.- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts.- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81.- Note.- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism.- 5. Sensationalism.- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge.- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism.- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience.- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense.- 5. Explanation vs. Consent.- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism.- 7. Conclusion.- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis?.- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked?.- II. Can Refutation be Final?.- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated.- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports?.- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection?.- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports?.- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations.- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics.- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science.- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance.- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction.- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman's Problem.- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing.- IV. The Need forConstraints is Quite Real.- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses.- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail.- VII. Conclusion.- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement.- 8. Towards A Theory Of 'Ad Hoc' Hypotheses.- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence.- II. The Conventional Element in Science.- III. Reducing the Conventions.- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses.- V. What is a Mess?.- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism.- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics.- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems.- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated.- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics.- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science.- V. Popper's Theory of Science.- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways.- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science.- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics.- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks.- Appendix: What is a Natural Law?.- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics.- I. How Do we Select Questions?.- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works.- III.The Literature on Questions.- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions.- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions.- VI. Collingwood's Peculiarity.- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions.- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions.- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality.- X.Collingwood in a New Garb.- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician.- Notes.- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences.- Appendix: Reply to Commentators.- 12.TheConfusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science.- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom.- Notes.- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology.- I. Kant's Scandal.- II. Whitehead's Scandal.- III.The Facts About Induction.- IV.Success and Rationality.- V. The Sociology of Knowledge.- Appendix: Duhem's Instrumentalism and Autonomism.- 14. Posit