This study contains twenty-two essays by leading historians on the Tokugawa Period (1600-1868), eight of which have never before been published. The Tokugawa Period has long been seen as one of Eastern feudalism, awaiting the breakthrough that came with the Meiji enlightenment and the opening of Japan to the West. The general thrust of these papers is to show that in many institutional aspects Japan was far from backward before the Meiji Period, and that many of the preconditions of modernization were present and developing much earlier than has generally been believed. This collection will be particularly valuable to students and scholars of comparative and Japanese modernization.
Originally published in 1968.
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Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan
By John Whitney Hall, Marius B. JansenPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1968 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-00013-8Contents
Foreword John W. Hall and Marius B. Jansen, vii,
Part One: Introduction,
1. The Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudalism Joseph R. Strayer, 3,
2. Feudalism in Japan-A Reassessment John W. Hall (Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1962), 15,
Part Two: The Establishment of Daimyo Rule,
3. The New Look of Tokugawa History John W. Hall, 55,
4. Foundations of the Modern Japanese Daimyo John W. Hall (Journal of Asian Studies, 1961), 65,
5. The Ikeda House and its Retainers in Bizen John W. Hall, 79,
6. Tosa in the Sixteenth Century: The 100 Article Code of Chosokabe Motochika Marius B. Jansen (Oriens Extremus, 1963), 89,
7. Tosa in the Seventeenth Century: The Establishment of Yamauchi Rule Marius B. Jansen, 115,
8. The Consolidation of Power in Satsuma-han Robert Sakai, 131,
Part Three: Daimyo Rule in Castle Town and Village,
9. Materials for the Study of Local History in Japan: Pre-Meiji Daimyo Records John W. Hall (Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 1957), 143,
10. The Castle Town and Japan's Modern Urbanization John W. Hall (Far Eastern Quarterly, 1955), 169,
11. 'Changes in Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period E. S. Crawcour (Journal of Asian Studies, 1957), 169,
12. The Evolution of Tokugawa Law Dan Fenno Henderson, 203,
13. Bakufu versus Kabuki Donald H. Shively (Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 1955), 231,
14. The Japanese Village in the Seventeenth Century Thomas C. Smith (Journal of Economic History, 1952), 263,
15. The Land Tax in the Tokugawa Period Thomas C. Smith (Journal of Asian Studies, 1958), 283,
16. Village Autonomy and Articulation with the State Harumi Befu (Journal of Asian Studies, 1965), 301,
Part Four: Late Tokugawa,
17. Tokugawa and Modern Japan Marius B. Jansen (Japan Quarterly, 1965), 317,
18. Tosa During the Last Century of Tokugawa Rule Marius B. Jansen, 331,
19. Talent and the Social Order in Tokugawa Japan Ronald P. Dore (Past and Present, 1962), 349,
20. The Restoration Movement in Choshu Albert Craig (Journal of Asian Studies, 1959), 363,
21. From Tokugawa to Meiji in Japanese Local Administration John W. Hall, 375,
INDEX, 389,
CHAPTER 1
THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD AND JAPANESE FEUDALISM
JOSEPH R. STRAYER
Most students of the European Middle Ages would now, I think, admit that feudalism existed in Japan. They would also admit that it was "real" feudalism, and not just a set of institutions that looked like feudalism on the surface but actually worked in a very different way. Japanese feudalism belongs to the same genus as European feudalism; it is not like the marsupial wolf which resembles a European wolf but in reality is a kind of ferocious opossum.
No matter what definition of feudalism is used, Japan can he brought under its terms. I happen to prefer a rather narrow political definition, on the grounds that feudalism simply ceases to have any specific meaning when it is used to describe economic and social conditions. Great estates cultivated by poorly paid, almost landless laborers can exist without feudalism (for example, collective farms), just as factories and an urban proletariat can exist without capitalism. It is true, of course, that the political structure necessarily affects the economic and social structure: the dominant group in any organized community will control and divert production to suit its own purposes and will impose its standards and values on society. But the methods and forms of economic control and the social values which are inculcated vary with the political system and not vice versa.
In political terms, feudalism is marked by a fragmentation of political authority, private possession of public rights, and a ruling class composed (at least originally) of military leaders and their followers. It is not necessary to demonstrate that these conditions existed in Japan, perhaps even more noticeably than in medieval western Europe. Indeed, while extensive areas in western Europe were never feudalized, none of Japan remained untouched by feudalism.
It is also clear that the early and middle stages of Japanese feudalism were not unlike the corresponding stages in Europe. At first, public authority and public officials continued to exist alongside of increasingly powerful feudal lords. The central government retained power in some areas while losing it in others, and only gradually faded away to a shadow. The peak of fragmentation of authority and of private control of rights of government came several centuries after the process of feudalization had begun. All this seems familiar and reasonable to a western medievalist.
It is the final stage — the reversal of the process of fragmentation — which is strange and puzzling. It is strange because devices which proved dangerous or ephemeral in Europe-such as the existence of large principalities-were used effectively in Japan by the shogun to increase his authority. It is puzzling because the final stage lasted so long, because the changes which took place in the Tokugawa period were so slow that at times they were almost imperceptible. I judge that my colleagues whose views are represented in this book are also somewhat puzzled by political developments between 1600 and 1850. It is a period in which the forms of feudalism were carefully preserved while much of the substance vanished. But if the substance was vanishing, why were the forms necessary? Conversely, if some of the substance remained (as I think it did), why was it not disruptive, why could it be safely tolerated by the shogunate?
Let me elaborate a little on these points. There are two periods in western European feudalism which bear some resemblance to Tokugawa Japan. The first comes at the very beginning, in the ninth and tenth centuries, when the last Carolingians tried to hold their realm together by establishing great commands — the duchy of Burgundy, the duchy of Gothia, the duchy of Francia, and so on. The men who held these commands were at first not unlike Tokugawa daimyos: they were officials of the king; they or their heirs could be moved from one district to another; they could be forced to surrender or exchange some of the counties they administered. But very soon the holders of the great commands became hereditary rulers practically independent of the king, and soon after that the great commands broke up into smaller units. Burgundy might be compared to Tosa: each province was about equally distant from central authority; each had aspirations to control neighboring areas. But Burgundy paid less and less attention to royal orders, and in turn the subordinate counts of Burgundy paid less and less attention to the orders of the duke. Tosa, on the contrary, remained united and obedient. In short, Japanese feudalism seems to be marching backwards; it ends in the pattern with which western feudalism began.
The other period in western history which has some parallel to Tokugawa Japan cannot be dated so precisely; it begins with the emergence of large feudal principalities in France and Germany in the eleventh or twelfth centuries and lasts until the principalities were either absorbed into a larger political unit or became independent states. But the difference is that in Europe the period of feudal principalities was a period of...
