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Inhaltsangabe: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976, is the second installment in the two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. As the U.S. government wrestles with tough questions on how to bring peace and stability to countries torn by internal strife, Andrew J. Birtle provides context for these concerns by describing how the United States attempted to suppress insurgencies and build nations during the Cold War. Employing a range of primary and secondary sources, Birtle explains how the Army in the 1950s and 1960s developed a dual strategy that combined military measures with political and socioeconomic reforms. On the military side, he states, doctrine advocated aggressive offensive operations, elaborate intelligence networks, and extensive security measures to drive the guerrillas away from inhabited areas and to secure the population from rebel influence and intimidation. On the civil side, Birtle continues, doctrine called for the implementation of measures to restore the norms of social and economic life; to establish efficient and popular government; and to redress, when possible, the causes of unrest. Birtle uses case studies of counterinsurgency wars in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Latin America, and Vietnam to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the nation's approach to counterinsurgency. Although the United States' counterinsurgency record was mixed, Birtle shows that the precepts underpinning U.S. doctrine have remained surprisingly constant over the years. By furnishing an in-depth look at how the Army performed its counterinsurgency and nation-building responsibilities during a previous era of global instability, Birtle sheds some needed light on the work that must be done today and tomorrow.
Inhaltsangabe: Examines the nature of counterinsurgency and nation-building missions, the institutional obstacles inherent in dealing effectively with such operations, and the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. doctrine, including the problems that can occur when that doctrine morphs into dogma.
Titel: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency ...
Verlag: Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History
Zustand: very good
Buchbeschreibung Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History, 2006. Buchzustand: Good. First. N/A. Former Library book. Shows some signs of wear, and may have some markings on the inside. Buchnummer des Verkäufers GRP56640435
Buchbeschreibung Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History, 2006. Buchzustand: Good. First. N/A. Shows some signs of wear, and may have some markings on the inside. Buchnummer des Verkäufers GRP91631237
Buchbeschreibung Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History. Hardcover. Buchzustand: Good. 0160729602 Satisfaction Guaranteed. Please contact us with any inquiries. We ship daily. Buchnummer des Verkäufers Z0160729602Z3
Buchbeschreibung Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History, 2006. Hardcover. Buchzustand: Used: Good. Buchnummer des Verkäufers SONG0160729602
Buchbeschreibung Buchzustand: Good. Book Condition: Good. Buchnummer des Verkäufers 97801607296074.0
Buchbeschreibung Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History, 2006. Hardcover. Buchzustand: Used: Good. Ships with Tracking Number! INTERNATIONAL WORLDWIDE Shipping available. May not contain Access Codes or Supplements. Buy with confidence, excellent customer service!. Buchnummer des Verkäufers 0160729602
Buchbeschreibung Dept. of the Army, 2007. Hardcover. Buchzustand: New. Brand new. Fine. Clean, unmarked pages. Perfect binding and cover. Ships daily. (GOV). Buchnummer des Verkäufers 20-Y9G5-FM2M
Buchbeschreibung Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History. Hardcover. Buchzustand: Fine. 0160729602 Hardcover, no writing or marks, no dust jacket, one small dark spot on cover, first printing, 2006, Center for Military History. Buchnummer des Verkäufers 8R-RS2L-ZHOK