Isbn: 9780195159882 - deflating existential consequence: a case for nominalism (25 Ergebnisse)

Zustand: good. A copy that has been read, remains in good condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine and cover show signs of wear. Pages can include notes and highlighting and show signs of wear, and the copy can include "From the library of" labels or previous owner inscriptions. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships via media mail.…

hardcover. Zustand: Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. New Copy. Customer Service Guaranteed.

Hardcover. Zustand: As New. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: As New. Hbk, 241pp an unread copy excellent clean tight unmarked in sleeve-protected dj as new.

Zustand: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,600grams, ISBN:0195159888. …

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Zustand: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense. Num Pages: 256 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPJ; PBCD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 240 x 166 x 23. Weight in Grams: 534. . 2003. Hardback. . . . .…

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Zustand: New. If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept (as an essential part of scientific doctrine) true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoid a militant Realism which forces our commitment to anything that our theories quantify over. Escaping metaphysical straitjackets (such as the correspondence theory of truth), while retaining the insight that some truths are about objects that do exist, Azzouni says that we can sort scientifically-given objects into two categories: ones which exist, and to which we forge instrumental access in order to learn their properties, and ones which do not, that is, which are made up in exactly the same sense that fictional objects are. He offers as a case study a small portion of Newtonian physics, and one result of his classification of its ontological commitments, is that it does not commit us to absolute space and time.…

Zustand: New. If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense. Num Pages: 256 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPJ; PBCD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 240 x 166 x 23. Weight in Grams: 534. . 2003. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Hardback. Zustand: New. If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept (as an essential part of scientific doctrine) true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoid a militant Realism which forces our commitment to anything that our theories quantify over. Escaping metaphysical straitjackets (such as the correspondence theory of truth), while retaining the insight that some truths are about objects that do exist, Azzouni says that we can sort scientifically-given objects into two categories: ones which exist, and to which we forge instrumental access in order to learn their properties, and ones which do not, that is, which are made up in exactly the same sense that fictional objects are. He offers as a case study a small portion of Newtonian physics, and one result of his classification of its ontological commitments, is that it does not commit us to absolute space and time.…

Zustand: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept (as an essential part of scientific doctrine) true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoida militant Realism which forces our commitment to anything that our theories quantify over. Escaping metaphysical straitjackets (such as the correspondence theory of truth), while retaining the insightthat some truths are about objects that do exist, Azzouni says that we can sort scientifically-given objects into two categories: ones which exist, and to which we forge instrumental access in order to learn their properties, and ones which do not, that is, which are made up in exactly the same sense that fictional objects are. He offers as a case study a small portion of Newtonian physics, and one result of his classification of its ontological commitments, is that it doesnot commit us to absolute space and time. If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept - as an essential part of scientific doctrine - true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept (as an essential part of scientific doctrine) true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoida militant Realism which forces our commitment to anything that our theories quantify over. Escaping metaphysical straitjackets (such as the correspondence theory of truth), while retaining the insightthat some truths are about objects that do exist, Azzouni says that we can sort scientifically-given objects into two categories: ones which exist, and to which we forge instrumental access in order to learn their properties, and ones which do not, that is, which are made up in exactly the same sense that fictional objects are. He offers as a case study a small portion of Newtonian physics, and one result of his classification of its ontological commitments, is that it doesnot commit us to absolute space and time. If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept - as an essential part of scientific doctrine - true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. If we must take mathematical statements to be true, must we also believe in the existence of abstract invisible mathematical objects accessible only by the power of pure thought? Jody Azzouni says no, and he claims that the way to escape such commitments is to accept (as an essential part of scientific doctrine) true statements which are about objects that don't exist in any sense at all. Azzouni illustrates what the metaphysical landscape looks like once we avoida militant Realism which forces our commitment to anything that our theories quantify over. Escaping metaphysical straitjackets (such as the correspondence theory of truth), while retaining the insightthat some truths are about objects that do exist, Azzouni says that we can sort scientifically-given objects into two categories: ones which exist, and to which we forge instrumental access in order to learn their properties, and ones which do not, that is, which are made up in exactly the same sense that fictional objects are. He offers as a case study a small portion of Newtonian physics, and one result of his classification of its ontological commitments, is that it doesnot commit us to absolute space and time. If we take mathematical statements to be true, then must we also believe in the existence of invisible mathematical objects, accessible only by the power of thought? Jody Azzouni says we do not have to, and claims that the way to escape such a commitment is to accept - as an essential part of scientific doctrine - true statements which are 'about' objects which don't exist in any real sense. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Deflating Existential Consequence | A Case for Nominalism | Jody Azzouni | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2004 | Oxford University Press | EAN 9780195159882 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…

Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 252.

Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 252 9:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Zustand: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 252.