9780521781749 - Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 72) von Zagare, Frank C.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Frank C... (17 Ergebnisse)

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Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.

Zustand: New. The first general analysis of deterrence since the Cold War, using game theory and containing numerous historical examples. Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Num Pages: 442 pages, 38 b/w illus. 15 tables. BIC Classification: JPS; JW. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 29. Weight in Grams: 806. . 2000. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Zustand: New. The first general analysis of deterrence since the Cold War, using game theory and containing numerous historical examples. Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Num Pages: 442 pages, 38 b/w illus. 15 tables. BIC Classification: JPS; JW. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 29. Weight in Grams: 806. . 2000. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . .

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. illustrated edition. 442 pages. 9.00x6.25x1.50 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 442.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardback. Zustand: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 442 9:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Zustand: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 442.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Zustand: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors analysis provides a new unders.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Perfect Deterrence | Frank C. Zagare (u. a.) | Buch | Englisch | 2010 | Cambridge University Press | EAN 9780521781749 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.