9780792391135 - Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications (Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, Band 6) (18 Ergebnisse)

gebundene Ausgabe. Zustand: Gut. 244 Seiten Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 520.

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Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

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Zustand: New. Editor(s): Einhorn, Michael A. Series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy. Num Pages: 244 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KJU. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 15. Weight in Grams: 542. . 1991. Hardback. . . . .

Zustand: New. pp. 260.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company's costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility's rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states.

Zustand: New. Editor(s): Einhorn, Michael A. Series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy. Num Pages: 244 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KJU. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 15. Weight in Grams: 542. . 1991. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Zustand: gut. 1991. Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, 6 In deutscher Sprache. pages.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company's costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility's rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states. 260 pp. Englisch.

Gebunden. Zustand: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications | Michael A. Einhorn | Buch | Einband - fest (Hardcover) | Englisch | 1991 | Springer US | EAN 9780792391135 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Heidelberg, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, buchhandel-buch[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company's costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility's rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 260 pp. Englisch.

Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 260 52:B&W 6.14 x 9.21in or 234 x 156mm (Royal 8vo) Case Laminate on White w/Gloss Lam.

Zustand: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 260.