Isbn: 9781334018367 - continuous time stopping games with monotone reward structures (classic reprint) (3 Ergebnisse)

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  • Sprache: Englisch

    Verlag: Forgotten Books, 2018

    1334018367 / 9781334018367

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    PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

  • Sprache: Englisch

    Verlag: Forgotten Books, 2018

    1334018367 / 9781334018367

    • Softcover

    Anbieter: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Vereinigtes KönigreichPBShop.store UK

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    PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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    Sprache: Englisch

    Verlag: Forgotten Books, 2018

    1334018367 / 9781334018367

    • Softcover
    • Print-on-Demand

    Anbieter: Forgotten Books, London, Vereinigtes KönigreichForgotten Books

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    Paperback. Zustand: New. Print on Demand. This book introduces the concept of optimal stopping games in continuous time to the reader. This form of gameplay involves two or more entities aiming to determine the perfect moment to cease participation to maximize their return in the face of uncertain but continually changing parameters. By assessing current gains against the possibility of greater rewards in the future, players must make calculated decisions under time constraints. The author extends the research of Dynkin and others from discrete time settings to continuous ones, opening up new avenues of exploration for game theory. This book presents a framework for analyzing these games, including the existence of Nash equilibria and the characterization of their properties. Moreover, it examines the impact of various assumptions on the structure of the reward processes involved, providing insights into the strategic considerations of the players. The author's work expands the theoretical understanding of optimal stopping games and highlights their applicability in economics, finance, and management science. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item.