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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Applied Game Theory | Organized Crime and Law Enforcement Interaction, and Optimal Pay Structure in Hollywood | Aditya Chauhan | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2013 | VDM Verlag Dr. Müller | EAN 9783639101607 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: OmniScriptum GmbH & Co. KG, Bahnhofstr. 28, 66111 Saarbrücken, info[at]akademikerverlag[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.
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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In this book I apply a game-theoretic model toanalyze coexistence between organized crime andunaffiliated criminals in the context of unioncorruption. In case of two theft markets available tothe mafia and only one to the criminal, the mafiaprefers to coexist with a criminal rather than nothave access to that market at all. Further, anyincrease in the number of individual criminals doesnot affect the mafia s payoff. I also study therecruitment of criminals as informants in thepresence of prosecution threat and mafia-criminaltheft cooperation. I find that criminals receivingexogenous compensation for cooperative thefts exertthe highest level of cooperation with lawenforcement. In the final chapter of this book I usegame theory to show support for piece-ratecompensation for Hollywood actors. Support for such aproposal is also shown using personnel economicsresearch. Industry data shows that piece-ratecompensation may already be in place for successfulactors which may relate to producers avoiding highfixed costs or actors realizing higher returns.