The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) - Hardcover

Wirtz, James J.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0801424860 ISBN 13: 9780801424861

Verlag: Cornell University Press, 1991

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Críticas:

"This excellently researched and written volume is a positive addition to our understanding of the event that marked the turning point in U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War."-John R. Finch, Military Review "Wirtz analyzes both the North Vietnamese plans and the American effort to counter them in exquisite detail. . . . His book is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the Vietnam conflict and the pitfalls facing an intelligence effort to divine an enemy's plans."-Roger Hilsman, Political Science Quarterly "A fascinating book. Combining the disciplines of history and political science with insights from psychological theory, Wirtz has produced both a pathbreaking analysis and a cautionary tale."-Heath Twichell, Naval War College Review "Wirtz provides a persuasive explanation for how the Vietnamese achieved surprise at Tet, even though the Americans had intelligence warning them of the attack. His book should be required reading for those interested in this key aspect of the Vietnam War and in the study of intelligence failures."-Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., Journal of American History

Reseña del editor:

In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.

Über diese Auflage

• Verlag: Cornell University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 1991
• ISBN 10: 0801424860
• ISBN 13: 9780801424861
• Einband: Tapa dura
• Anzahl der Seiten: 272