Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957-1967 - Hardcover

Shemesh, Moshe

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 1845191889 ISBN 13: 9781845191887

Verlag: Liverpool University Press, 2007

Inhaltsangabe

Book by Shemesh Moshe

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Críticas:

"Primarily utilizing Arab primary sources, Shemesh reconstructs the history of the decade preceding the Six Day War between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. His reliance on previously unexamined Arab sources leads him to a number of novel conclusions, the most important of which include the notion that the Sinai War (of October 1956) had exacerbated rather than alleviated Arab-Israeli tensions and the Palestinian problem, that Nasir of Egypt was rational in his preparations for the conflict and that responsibility for the military fiasco is primarily attributable to Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, that Egyptian commitment to Palestinian self-determination was strong and not an opportunistic fig leaf, that the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was a major trigger for the conflict, that the defeat of Arab forces in the war prompted the Arab states to decisively turn towards political processes in order to resolve the conflict, and that the Israeli seizure of the West Bank served to strengthen the political regime of Jordan." --Reference & Research Book News "A valuable contribution to the understanding of Arab politics in the decade before the Six-Day War. Well-referenced and injecting new Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian documents into the narrative, Shemesh's book challenges historians' conventional wisdom... a necessary addition to any serious library or scholar's bookshelf." --Middle East Quarterly

Reseña del editor:

The Six Day War was the climax in the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The downturn began in 1957 when Nasir began preaching the idea of Arab nationalism, while placing the Palestinian problem at its centre. The decade between the Sinai War and Six Day War was marked by preparations by both sides for an all-out military confrontation which both sides viewed as inevitable. As the Arab states formulated their positions on the conflict's goals and the ways of attaining them, differences of opinion erupted between Egypt and Syria. Nasir wanted to decide the time and place for the war that would 'liberate Filastin'. He was determined to meet Israel on the battlefield only when he was certain that the outcome would mean a decisive Arab victory. He consciously and strategically led Egypt to war, carefully weighing the implications of each political/military step. This study, based almost exclusively on hitherto unavailable Arab primary sources, sets out the crystallisation of Arab strategy to reveal conclusions substantively different from previous scholarly and political-military assessments. Issues dealt with include: the relevance of the Filastin problem as key to understanding the descent to war; the pivotal Syrian water struggle as a key motivating factor; Nasir's military blunders with respect to advice received from the Egyptian High Command; Nasir's acceptance of the principle that Egypt had to absorb the first Israeli strike, to be followed by Egypt's delivery of a second, decisive strike; the "political process" approach to solving the conflict as evidenced by the Khartoum protocols notwithstanding the "1948 refugee problem"; and the Hashemite regime's response to Palestinians' heightened national awakening. The enlistment of all the Arab states to Nasir's moves in May 1967 testifies not only to the president's charismatic leadership, but also to the depths of the 1948 trauma (al-nakba), which lies at the heart of any future compromise or agreement.

Über diese Auflage

• Verlag: Liverpool University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2007
• ISBN 10: 1845191889
• ISBN 13: 9781845191887
• Einband: Tapa dura
• Anzahl der Seiten: 345