9781899548088 (1 Ergebnisse)
Verlag: Verification Technology Information Centre [VERTIC], London, 1997
- Softcover
- Erstausgabe
Anbieter: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, USAGround Zero Books, Ltd.
Verkäufer/-in kontaktierenVerkäufer/-in mit 5 SternenZustand: Gebraucht - Gut
EUR 66,70
EUR 4,32 VersandVersand innerhalb von USAAnzahl: 1 verfügbar
Wraps. Zustand: Very good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. [4], 36 pages. Footnotes. Glossary. Format is approximately 8.25 inches by 11.75 inches. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Pencil erasure on front cover. VERTIC is an independent, not-for-profit non-governmental organization. Our mission is to support the develo…pment, implementation and effectiveness of international agreements and related regional and national initiatives, with particular attention to issues of monitoring, review, legislation and verification. VERTIC publishes its research on verification regimes through a series of openly available publications. The centre also offers training through workshops carried out around the world, as well as through our internship programme. We help governments and international organizations in their efforts to make regimes binding by offering ratification support. VERTIC also assists governments in translating commitments undertaken in international law into national legislation and regulation. We conduct all our work in an objective and impartial manner. In 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors' formally requested the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards (SAGSI) to make proposals to tighten the safeguards regime and to make it more efficient. The wish to have a plan of action by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in mid-1995 demonstrated international concerns about the continued credibility of the non-proliferation regime given the experiences of Iraq and North Korea. The time-scale was reflected in the working title "Programme 93+2" - two years beyond 1993. Iraq and North Korea were both Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) party to the NPT and thus signatories to INFCIRC/153-type model protocols that NNWSs commit to agreeing with the IAEA to verify that nuclear facilities are used for peaceful purposes only. The scenario of an NPT member deliberately embarking on a clandestine programme to develop nuclear weapons was a reality with which the IAEA safeguards system had not been designed to cope.
