jimenez erick raphael (34 Ergebnisse)

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Paperback. Zustand: New. In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.

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Zustand: New. pp. 273.

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Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy. This book challenges flawed readings of Aristotle's psychology, offering the first book-length treatment in English of his thinking about mind. Scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotelian psychology, will find this original interpretation highly valuable. It will also appeal to historians of later philosophy and to modern philosophers of mind. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: New. In.

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Paperback. Zustand: New. In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.

Zustand: New. A fresh interpretation of this important and widely misunderstood concept as an acquired ability to make principles and essences intelligible. BIC Classification: HPCA. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). . . 2017. Hardcover. . . . .

Hardback. Zustand: New. In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.

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Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 240 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Zustand: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 3 working days.

Zustand: New. A fresh interpretation of this important and widely misunderstood concept as an acquired ability to make principles and essences intelligible. BIC Classification: HPCA. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). . . 2017. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy. This book challenges flawed readings of Aristotle's psychology, offering the first book-length treatment in English of his thinking about mind. Scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotelian psychology, will find this original interpretation highly valuable. It will also appeal to historians of later philosophy and to modern philosophers of mind. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Zustand: New. This book challenges flawed readings of Aristotle s psychology, offering the first book-length treatment in English of his thinking about mind. Scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotelian psychology, will find this original interp.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - A fresh interpretation of this important and widely misunderstood concept as an acquired ability to make principles and essences intelligible.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Aristotle's Concept of Mind | Erick Raphael Jimenez | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2017 | Cambridge University Press | EAN 9781107194182 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.

Hardback. Zustand: New. In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.

Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy. This book challenges flawed readings of Aristotle's psychology, offering the first book-length treatment in English of his thinking about mind. Scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotelian psychology, will find this original interpretation highly valuable. It will also appeal to historians of later philosophy and to modern philosophers of mind. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Zustand: new. Paperback. In this book, Erick Raphael Jimenez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jimenez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jimenez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy. This book challenges flawed readings of Aristotle's psychology, offering the first book-length treatment in English of his thinking about mind. Scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotelian psychology, will find this original interpretation highly valuable. It will also appeal to historians of later philosophy and to modern philosophers of mind. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback / softback. Zustand: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 273.