Meinhardt holger (53 Ergebnisse)

Softcover. Octavo, 205 pages. In Very Good condition. Bound in original yellow and gray softcover. Spine is gray and yellow with black lettering. Minimal edge wear. Shelved in ND-I. 1418898. FP New Rockville Stock.

XXXIII, 242 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Theory and decision library : Series C, Game theory, mathematical programming and operations research ; Vol. 45. Sprache: Englisch.…

Hardcover. Zustand: VG/VG/VG. A gray casebound book. There is a red dust jacket with black text on the spine. There is an onion skin jacket over that. the end pages are illustrated. Pages: (10), 11-66, (2). Illustrated in black-and-white. There is a 28 page staplebound pamphlet in a pocket on the back inside cover, which has several color illustrations.…

Zustand: New.

Paperback or Softback. Zustand: New. The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games: An Exercise in Algorithmic Game Theory. Book.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New. pp. 220.

Zustand: New. pp. 278.

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 2014 edition. 150 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.…

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.…

Gebundene Ausgabe. Zustand: Neu. This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 530.…

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 276 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.65 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games | An Exercise in Algorithmic Game Theory | Holger Ingmar Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Theory and Decision Library C | xxxiii | Englisch | 2016 | Springer | EAN 9783662513149 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. …

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations | Holger I. Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | viii | Englisch | 2002 | Springer | EAN 9783540432951 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. …

Softcover. Zustand: Gut. Gebraucht - Gut Zustand: Gut, VIII, 205 pp. About this book: The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered. Written for researchers.…

Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 276 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.…

Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.…

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Zustand: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.