Zwicker william s (47 Ergebnisse)

Hardcover. Zustand: Very good. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Very good. Very good.

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Hardback. Zustand: New. Simple games are mathematical structures inspired by voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill, is pitted against the status quo. The first in-depth mathematical study of the subject as a coherent subfield of finite combinatorics--one with its own organized body of techniques and results--this book blends new theorems with some of the striking results from threshold logic, making all of it accessible to game theorists. Introductory material receives a fresh treatment, with an emphasis on Boolean subgames and the Rudin-Keisler order as unifying concepts. Advanced material focuses on the surprisingly wide variety of properties related to the weightedness of a game. A desirability relation orders the individuals or coalitions of a game according to their influence in the corresponding voting system. As Taylor and Zwicker show, acyclicity of such a relation approximates weightedness--the more sensitive the relation, the closer the approximation. A trade is an exchange of players among coalitions, and robustness under such trades is equivalent to weightedness of the game.Robustness under trades that fit some restrictive exchange pattern typically characterizes a wider class of simple games--for example, games for which some particular desirability order is acyclic. Finally, one can often describe these wider classes of simple games by weakening the total additivity of a weighting to obtain what is called a pseudoweighting. In providing such uniform explanations for many of the structural properties of simple games, this book showcases numerous new techniques and results.…

hardcover. Zustand: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title.

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Hardcover. Zustand: New. Brand new book, sourced directly from publisher. Dispatch time is 3-4 days from our warehouse. Book will be sent in robust, secure packaging to ensure it reaches you securely.

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Hardback. Zustand: New. Simple games are mathematical structures inspired by voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill, is pitted against the status quo. The first in-depth mathematical study of the subject as a coherent subfield of finite combinatorics--one with its own organized body of techniques and results--this book blends new theorems with some of the striking results from threshold logic, making all of it accessible to game theorists. Introductory material receives a fresh treatment, with an emphasis on Boolean subgames and the Rudin-Keisler order as unifying concepts. Advanced material focuses on the surprisingly wide variety of properties related to the weightedness of a game. A desirability relation orders the individuals or coalitions of a game according to their influence in the corresponding voting system. As Taylor and Zwicker show, acyclicity of such a relation approximates weightedness--the more sensitive the relation, the closer the approximation. A trade is an exchange of players among coalitions, and robustness under such trades is equivalent to weightedness of the game.Robustness under trades that fit some restrictive exchange pattern typically characterizes a wider class of simple games--for example, games for which some particular desirability order is acyclic. Finally, one can often describe these wider classes of simple games by weakening the total additivity of a weighting to obtain what is called a pseudoweighting. In providing such uniform explanations for many of the structural properties of simple games, this book showcases numerous new techniques and results.…

Hardback. Zustand: New. Simple games are mathematical structures inspired by voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill, is pitted against the status quo. The first in-depth mathematical study of the subject as a coherent subfield of finite combinatorics--one with its own organized body of techniques and results--this book blends new theorems with some of the striking results from threshold logic, making all of it accessible to game theorists. Introductory material receives a fresh treatment, with an emphasis on Boolean subgames and the Rudin-Keisler order as unifying concepts. Advanced material focuses on the surprisingly wide variety of properties related to the weightedness of a game. A desirability relation orders the individuals or coalitions of a game according to their influence in the corresponding voting system. As Taylor and Zwicker show, acyclicity of such a relation approximates weightedness--the more sensitive the relation, the closer the approximation. A trade is an exchange of players among coalitions, and robustness under such trades is equivalent to weightedness of the game.Robustness under trades that fit some restrictive exchange pattern typically characterizes a wider class of simple games--for example, games for which some particular desirability order is acyclic. Finally, one can often describe these wider classes of simple games by weakening the total additivity of a weighting to obtain what is called a pseudoweighting. In providing such uniform explanations for many of the structural properties of simple games, this book showcases numerous new techniques and results.…

Zustand: New. In English.

Zustand: New. In English.

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Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. The Future of Economic Design | The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers | Jean-François Laslier (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Studies in Economic Design | xvi | Englisch | 2020 | Springer | EAN 9783030180522 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. …

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Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from Where do we go from here The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors - both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers - responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including:retrospective assessments or surveys of the field;opinion papers; reflectionson critical points for the development of the discipline;proposals for the immediate future; 'science fiction'; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces-as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.…

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from Where do we go from here The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors - both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers - responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including:retrospective assessments or surveys of the field;opinion papers; reflectionson critical points for the development of the discipline;proposals for the immediate future; 'science fiction'; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces-as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.…

Zustand: New.

Hardback. Zustand: New. Simple games are mathematical structures inspired by voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill, is pitted against the status quo. The first in-depth mathematical study of the subject as a coherent subfield of finite combinatorics--one with its own organized body of techniques and results--this book blends new theorems with some of the striking results from threshold logic, making all of it accessible to game theorists. Introductory material receives a fresh treatment, with an emphasis on Boolean subgames and the Rudin-Keisler order as unifying concepts. Advanced material focuses on the surprisingly wide variety of properties related to the weightedness of a game. A desirability relation orders the individuals or coalitions of a game according to their influence in the corresponding voting system. As Taylor and Zwicker show, acyclicity of such a relation approximates weightedness--the more sensitive the relation, the closer the approximation. A trade is an exchange of players among coalitions, and robustness under such trades is equivalent to weightedness of the game.Robustness under trades that fit some restrictive exchange pattern typically characterizes a wider class of simple games--for example, games for which some particular desirability order is acyclic. Finally, one can often describe these wider classes of simple games by weakening the total additivity of a weighting to obtain what is called a pseudoweighting. In providing such uniform explanations for many of the structural properties of simple games, this book showcases numerous new techniques and results.…

Zustand: New. 1st ed. 2019 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP.

Zustand: New. pp. 7733 1st ed. 2019 edition.

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. illustrated edition. 248 pages. 9.50x6.75x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 539 pages. 9.25x6.10x1.34 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Zustand: Brand New. 556 pages. 9.25x6.10x1.34 inches. In Stock.