Michael r matheny (51 Ergebnisse)

Paperback. Zustand: Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.

Zustand: Very Good. Very Good condition. Volume 28. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Cover and edges may have some wear.

Zustand: New.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.

Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. This book has very minor rubbing to the front and back, as well as some faint surface scrateches, and light wear along the edges and at the corners. otherwise this book is in very good condition, with clean pages, vivid images, and tight binding.

Paperback or Softback. Zustand: New. Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945. Book.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Zustand: New. Military commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of ""operational art,"" the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff employ in designing, synchronizing, and conducting battles and major operations to achieve strategic goals. Until now, historians of military theory have generally agreed that modern operational art developed between the first and second world wars, not in the United States but in Germany and the Soviet Union, whose armies were supposedly the innovators and greatest practitioners of operational art. Some have even claimed that U.S. forces struggled in World War II because their commanders had no systematic understanding of operational art.Michael R. Matheny believes previous studies have not appreciated the evolution of U.S. military thinking at the operational level. Although they may rightly point to the U.S. Army's failure to modernize or develop a sophisticated combined arms doctrine during the interwar years, they focus too much on technology or tactical doctrine. In his revealing account, Matheny shows that it was at the operational level, particularly in mounting joint and combined operations, that senior American commanders excelled - and laid a foundation for their country's victory in World War II.Matheny draws on archival materials from military educational institutions, planning documents, and operational records of World War II campaigns. Examining in detail the development of American operational art as land, sea, and air power matured in the twentieth century, he shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. war colleges educated and trained commanders during the interwar years specifically for the operational art they employed in World War II.After 1945, in the face of nuclear warfare, the American military largely abandoned operational art. But since the Vietnam War, U.S. commanders have found operational art increasingly important as they pursue modern global and expeditionary warfare requiring coordination among multiple service branches and the forces of allied countries. …

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: New.

Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. reprint edition. 334 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Operational art as a focus for U.S. doctrine has only recently emerged in our manuals. Initially, operational art emerged during the interwar period. Reflecting upon the experience of World War I, German and Soviet theorists recognized that mass armies and new technologies required successive military operations. Operational art was developed to provide the conceptual framework far successive operations. This monograph seeks to answer the question, was operational art developed in the U.S. Army during the interwar years This paper uses lectures and texts from the curricular archives of the Command and General Staff College and the War College to analyze the theory and doctrine of the interwar period. The criteria used to evaluate the doctrine are: elements of campaign planning, sophistication of approach (role of logistics, joint and combined operations), and operational concepts. The key operational concepts examined are phased operations, culminating point, center of gravity, and lines of operation. This study concludes that operational art did exist in the American army during the interwar period. Moreover, in comparison to military thinking in Europe at that time, it was certainly as sophisticated. The Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth provided a doctrine increasingly influenced by the operational concepts of Clausewitz. The Army War College exercised joint planning and established a formal system of plans which linked strategic aims all the way dawn to tactical objectives. The implications of this study suggest that the interwar emphasis on concentration and planning may be useful to current doctrine developers.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.…

Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - Although armor was developed and organized primarily for high intensity warfare, in the future low intensity conflict will be the most prevalent form of war. Since the army has invested so much of its combat power and force structure into mechanized forces, it should be prepared to use those forces in LIC. This monograph uses J.F.C. Fuller's five combat functions: protect, find, fix, hit, and destroy, to examine the proper role of armor. Vietnam and Afghanistan are analyzed as case studies of the employment of mechanized forces in the LIC. In both conflicts the armies found it necessary to modify their conventional doctrine for armor. In Vietnam the U.S. Army successfully used mechanized forces to hit and protect. However, the reliance on indirect fires to destroy the enemy limited the effectiveness of armor. In Afghanistan the Soviets have enjoyed less tactical success with armor because of terrain, organization, and their operational plan for victory. A look at current doctrine reveals the need for a combined arms doctrine for heavy and light forces in LIC. Current doctrine also does not address the most effective armor organization for the conduct of operations in LIC--the armored cavalry regiment. The study concludes that the most appropriate tactical doctrine for armor in LIC depends upon the combat function it serves within the combined arms team. These functions can vary with terrain, organization, and the operational plan. At the very least, armor can protect and hit. When properly organized and employed it can also be used to find, fix, and in combination with other arms, destroy insurgent forces. Mechanized forces are best employed in small scale cordon search operations from battalion to brigade size. Their mobility and firepower are best used in encirclement operations or as a reaction force. Finally, the near term and future implications of this study are considered under Fuller's combat functions.…

Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Very Good. 1st Edition. Very good, clean, tight condition. First printing. Jacket in mylar cover. Text free of marks. Professional book dealer since 1999. All orders are processed promptly and carefully packaged.

Hardcover. Zustand: Very Good. DJ has a short taped tear at the spine. Else like new with no marks. Sharp corners.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware.

Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Zustand: New. Military commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of ""operational art,"" the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff employ in designing, synchronizing, and conducting battles and major operations to achieve strategic goals. Until now, historians of military theory have generally agreed that modern operational art developed between the first and second world wars, not in the United States but in Germany and the Soviet Union, whose armies were supposedly the innovators and greatest practitioners of operational art. Some have even claimed that U.S. forces struggled in World War II because their commanders had no systematic understanding of operational art.Michael R. Matheny believes previous studies have not appreciated the evolution of U.S. military thinking at the operational level. Although they may rightly point to the U.S. Army's failure to modernize or develop a sophisticated combined arms doctrine during the interwar years, they focus too much on technology or tactical doctrine. In his revealing account, Matheny shows that it was at the operational level, particularly in mounting joint and combined operations, that senior American commanders excelled - and laid a foundation for their country's victory in World War II.Matheny draws on archival materials from military educational institutions, planning documents, and operational records of World War II campaigns. Examining in detail the development of American operational art as land, sea, and air power matured in the twentieth century, he shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. war colleges educated and trained commanders during the interwar years specifically for the operational art they employed in World War II.After 1945, in the face of nuclear warfare, the American military largely abandoned operational art. But since the Vietnam War, U.S. commanders have found operational art increasingly important as they pursue modern global and expeditionary warfare requiring coordination among multiple service branches and the forces of allied countries. …

Zustand: New. Print on Demand.